Kurt Campbell argues that the U.S.-China relationship now has to be understood through allies, deterrence, and the Middle East shock rather than a simple bilateral lens. The conversation centers on how Iran, the Strait of Hormuz, and Trump’s Beijing summit are affecting Asia, Taiwan, and the credibility of U.S. strategy.
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This is an interview between Liz Economy and Kurt Campbell on China policy, alliance architecture, and the implications of current U.S. decisions for Asia. Campbell starts with a personal history of entering government in the late Cold War, working under Admiral William Crowe and Colin Powell, then moving into East Asia policy under Joe Nye during the Clinton administration. His core retrospective thesis is that the 1990s were defined by optimism about engagement, China’s integration into the international system, and the assumption that the U.S. could manage China largely through bilateral diplomacy. …
Near term, the setup is fragile: any ambiguity from the Trump-Xi meeting on Taiwan, plus continued Middle East strain, could weaken Asia deterrence and unsettle allies. The immediate risk is policy signaling that looks softer than expected or shows further resource diversion away from the Indo-Pacific.
Over the next few months, the likely path is a more transactional but still functioning U.S. alliance posture, with partners hedging while waiting to see whether Washington can sustain attention across theaters. The key validation is whether the administration keeps deterrence credible in Asia while managing Iran without further credibility loss.
Structurally, the video argues that the post-Cold War U.S. model is over: future power depends on dense alliances, middle-power coordination, and disciplined deterrence rather than unilateral leadership. If that system is not rebuilt, the world drifts toward spheres of influence or disorder, with China benefiting from U.S. inconsistency.
China's strategy is to use political visits and diplomatic gestures (like rolling out the red carpet for the KMT chair) to erode Taiwan's confidence and create political anxiety, not to take near-term military action.
The speaker interprets the KMT chair's visit to Beijing as a deliberate psychological/political operation to weaken Taiwan's confidence, not a signal of imminent military action.
The diversion of U.S. military assets from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East for the Iran conflict has degraded the quality of U.S. deterrence in Asia.
The speaker argues that the ballistic missile defense, marine expeditionary capabilities, aircraft carriers, and fighter aircraft previously accumulated for Indo-Pacific deterrence have been redirected to the Middle East, weakening America's strategic position against China.
The redeployment of military assets from Asia to the Middle East has degraded the quality of US deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
The speaker argues that capacity moved from Asia to the Middle East for inspection/stand-watch duties has reduced deterrence quality.
What were the main assumptions about the U.S.-China relationship in the 1990s, and how was that period different from today?
Campbell answers by first describing his early government service focused mainly on the Soviet Union, not China. He says the broader era was marked by optimism, a sense of American power after the Cold War, and expectations that globalization and U.S. unilateral influence could shape events.
When did China first come into your work, and what was your early view of it?
He says China entered his work somewhat by happenstance after a White House fellowship and a Treasury stint, when Joe Nye asked him to consider East Asia policy at the Pentagon. He had only limited prior exposure, but ended up staying in that role for five years and found it life-changing.
Wasn't there substantial pushback from conservatives in Congress during the peak engagement period with China?
The guest confirms there was pushback, noting restrictions were placed on information sharing, space cooperation, and other areas. He also notes that the Bush administration initially viewed China as a strategic threat, but 9/11 reoriented US foreign policy toward the Middle East, creating an imbalance that persists.
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