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Guerre en Iran : les révélations de l'ancien directeur du Mossad sur LCI|LCI

Channel: LCI Published: 2026-06-20 15:19
LCI

Yossi Cohen argues that the Iran ceasefire/understanding is not good because it leaves too many capabilities unresolved, especially ballistic missiles and nuclear-related activity. He says Israel and its partners should not trust Iran, believes regime change cannot be imposed from outside, and defends the Mossad’s long-running penetration of Iran that enabled the nuclear archives operation.

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Detailed summary

This is a geopolitical interview with Yossi Cohen, former Mossad director, focused almost entirely on Iran, the ceasefire/accord with the United States, and Israel’s intelligence operations against Iran. Cohen’s core thesis is blunt: the agreement is incomplete and, in its current or near-final form, is not good enough because it does not sufficiently constrain Iran’s ballistic missile program and broader covert behavior. He repeatedly says Iran cannot be trusted and argues that any durable settlement must include nuclear and missile restrictions, not just a narrow pause or partial understanding. He frames the current situation as a temporary ceasefire, not a final peace. In his view, the next 60 days matter because that is the window in which negotiators are supposed to move from discussion to a fuller agreement. …

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Main takeaways

  1. Cohen sees the Iran deal as incomplete unless it covers ballistic missiles as well as nuclear issues.
  2. He argues Iran is fundamentally untrustworthy and likely to conceal key programs.
  3. He does not believe regime change can be imposed from outside Israel or the U.S.
  4. He treats intelligence penetration as essential to understanding and countering Iran.
  5. He believes regional states like the UAE, Bahrain, and Oman are also exposed to Iranian threats.

Market read by horizon

Short term

Near term, the key risk is an incomplete Iran agreement that leaves ballistic missiles or covert activity unaddressed. That would keep geopolitical premium and regional security tension elevated.

  • The immediate focus is the next 60 days of negotiations; Cohen says that is the critical window for turning a ceasefire into a fuller deal.
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  • He sees the biggest near-term risk as a settlement that leaves ballistic missiles outside the agreement.
  • His tactical read is that recent public comments tolerating Iranian ballistic capability are a mistake and should be reversed.
Mid term

Over the next few months, the setup hinges on whether the final deal expands to include missile constraints and stronger verification. If it does not, the market should treat the ceasefire as a pause rather than a resolution.

  • Over the next several weeks to months, Cohen expects the key question to be whether the eventual accord explicitly constrains both nuclear and missile programs.
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  • If the agreement stays partial, he expects the strategic problem with Iran to persist rather than resolve.
  • He thinks pressure from Israeli or U.S. action may weaken the regime but will not by itself produce political change inside Iran.
Long term

Structurally, Cohen’s view implies a lasting Middle East regime of persistent Iran risk, where containment depends on intelligence, regional defense coordination, and verification rather than trust. The implication is that diplomatic breakthroughs are fragile unless they change Iran’s underlying capabilities and incentives.

  • Cohen’s structural view is that Iran is a persistent adversary that will keep trying to hide strategic capabilities.
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  • He implies that intelligence operations and deep infiltration remain necessary because conventional diplomacy alone is not enough.
  • He sees the regional security regime as one where Israel and neighboring states must plan for continuing Iranian missile and nuclear risk.
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Key claims (4)

BEARISH US-Iran nuclear deal

The US-Iran interim agreement is not a good deal because Iran cannot be trusted and will continue to hide nuclear, ballistic, and terrorist activities.

Cohen states the deal is bad based on his experience with Iranian deception; he argues Iran will keep lying about nuclear, ballistic, and terrorism activities.

BEARISH Iran ballistic missile program

The final comprehensive agreement within 60 days must include Iran's ballistic missile program, otherwise it will be a failure.

Cohen argues ballistic missiles threaten not just Israel but also UAE, Bahrain, and Oman, so leaving them out renders the deal a failure.

BEARISH JCPOA

The 2015 JCPOA was a bad deal because it left Iran with significant nuclear and ballistic capabilities.

Cohen, who served as Israel's special envoy to the P5+1 negotiations, asserts the JCPOA left Iran with too much capability.

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Assets discussed (4)

Iran nuclear deal
BEARISH other

Cohen says the agreement is not good and is incomplete without missile coverage.

JCPOA
BEARISH other

He says the 2015 JCPOA was not a good deal and left Iran with significant capabilities.

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Speakers

GUEST Yossi Cohen INTERVIEWER Interviewer (LCI)

Interview (4 Q&A)

accord Iran-États-Unis

Que pensez-vous de l'accord de fin de guerre entre les États-Unis et l'Iran, qui est critiqué en Israël comme un échec stratégique majeur car il n'aborde pas le nucléaire iranien ?

Yossi Cohen pense que l'accord n'est pas bon. Il dit qu'il ne fait pas confiance aux Iraniens du tout, et que l'Iran va garder une partie de mensonge énorme pour cacher ses activités concernant le soutien au terrorisme, le programme balistique et le programme nucléaire. Il estime que le programme balistique doit faire partie de l'accord, sinon c'est un échec.

JCPOA 2015

Est-ce que l'accord JCPOA de 2015 n'était finalement pas un bon accord quand on voit ce qui se passe actuellement ?

Non, ce n'était pas un bon accord selon Cohen. Il faisait partie de la délégation israélienne et était contre cet accord parce qu'il a laissé les Iraniens avec une grande partie de leurs capacités nucléaires et balistiques. Il pense qu'il faut vérifier pendant les 60 jours à venir que tous les programmes balistiques et nucléaires seront couverts.

changement de régime

La fin du régime iranien était un des objectifs d'Israël — est-ce donc un échec à l'heure actuelle ?

Cohen répond qu'il n'a jamais pensé qu'on pouvait changer le régime de l'extérieur. Il dit que seul le peuple iranien peut effectuer un changement de régime, pas Israël ni les États-Unis. Bien que les attaques israéliennes en Iran aident, le peuple iranien n'est pas sorti dans les rues car le régime est toujours là, affaibli mais toujours présent et menaçant son propre peuple.

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Where this transcript pushes against consensus

  • Cohen’s claim that the deal is unacceptable unless it includes ballistic missiles is a normative position, but he does not provide detailed legal text or negotiation specifics from the agreement.
  • He asserts Iran cannot be trusted and will continue concealment, but offers limited direct evidence in the interview beyond his intelligence experience.
  • His discussion of regime change is internally cautious, but he still implies military pressure could help protests without explaining the mechanism or likelihood.
  • He says regional states may make secret arrangements with Iran, but this is speculative and not substantiated in the transcript.

Topics

Iran nuclear dealballistic missilesJCPOAMossad operationsIranian regime stabilityregional securitynuclear archives theftIsrael-Iran confrontationU.S.-Iran negotiations

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