Mario Nawfal interviews Prof. Foad Izadi of Tehran University after Iran cancels the MOU signing ceremony in Switzerland, citing Israeli attacks in South Lebanon. Izadi frames the cancellation as Iran refusing to "leave Lebanon behind" and argues Iran will not restart talks without an actual ceasefire. He expresses deep skepticism that the US will honor the MOU, citing the 2015 nuclear deal precedent and the influence of the Israeli lobby in Congress. Nawfal presses Izadi on whether the MOU was the right decision for Iran; Izadi avoids a direct endorsement, worrying it may just be a US tactic to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and relieve oil-price pressure. In a striking moment, Izadi assigns 55%–65% odds of renewed US-Iran war and Iran-Israel war. The conversation highlights the trust deficit on both sides despite an MOU that many observers call generous to Iran.
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This is a geopolitical interview between host Mario Nawfal and Professor Foad Izadi of Tehran University, recorded in the immediate aftermath of Iran canceling the planned MOU signing ceremony in Switzerland. The conversation centers on the intersection of the MOU, Israeli military operations in South Lebanon, and Iran's strategic calculus. **Core thesis — Izadi's position:** Iran canceled the Switzerland trip because Israel's continued attacks in South Lebanon made it politically and morally impossible to proceed. He frames this in stark language: "Iran has decided not to leave Lebanon behind" and warns against "another genocide" in Lebanon. The MOU is useful to Iran primarily as leverage — it gives Iran a mechanism to force the US to restrain Israel, since "2/3 of Israeli weapons are made in the United States" (quoting JD Vance). …
The immediate setup is a diplomatic standoff: Iran has frozen the MOU track pending an actual Lebanon ceasefire, while Trump faces conflicting pressures — oil-price urgency (reserves reportedly near depletion) vs. his donor base's pro-Israel backlash (Israel Hayom calling him a "traitor"). The next 24–72 hours on the Lebanon ceasefire determine whether the MOU revives or collapses near-term. Oil markets should price elevated uncertainty until the Strait of Hormuz reopening is confirmed as durable.
The 60-day MOU negotiation window is the medium-term framework, but Izadi's base case is that US domestic politics (Israeli lobby, Democratic opposition, midterms) will sabotage implementation even if talks restart. The path to a durable outcome requires Trump to sustain pressure on Netanyahu — something he has never done consistently. Oil markets may see a temporary relief rally if the Strait reopens, but the structural risk premium won't fully dissipate because the MOU's implementation risk is priced as high by both Israeli and Iranian observers.
The structural regime is one of episodic crisis management, not resolution. The 2015 JCPOA pattern — negotiate, implement briefly, US withdraws, re-escalate — appears to be repeating. Izadi's 55%–65% war probability reflects the view that no piece of paper can bridge the underlying drivers: Iran's regional militia network, Israel's security doctrine, and a US political system where any agreement is reversible by the next administration. Unless the MOU includes mechanisms that survive political transitions in both countries, it is a pause, not a settlement.
Iran will not restart nuclear talks with the US until there is an actual ceasefire in Lebanon.
The speaker states that Iran canceled negotiations because of Israeli violence in Lebanon and will not restart until a ceasefire is implemented.
The US government signed the MOU with Iran without any intention of implementing its terms.
Speaker argues that the US historically makes promises it never intends to keep, citing Trump's tweet refusing to give Iran 'even 10 cents' and Hexet's threat to attack Iran hours after signing.
If Trump wants to separate Iran and Lebanon, he will not get any agreement out of Iran.
The speaker asserts that Iran ties ending violence in Lebanon to any broader agreement, making Lebanese ceasefire a prerequisite for any deal with the US.
How far do you think Iran would go in response to Israeli attacks in Lebanon — given they've pulled out of negotiations, threatened and struck Israel before, and there are unconfirmed reports about the Strait of Hormuz?
Iran will not leave Lebanon behind. Iranian officials decided not to restart talks until there is an actual ceasefire, and at the end of those talks Lebanon must also benefit from any eventual agreement. It is not possible to separate Iran and Lebanon; if Trump tries to separate them, he will not get any agreement out of Iran.
What is your interpretation of Mojtaba Khamenei's statement about the MOU?
He argues the statement reflects how the Islamic Republic actually works: the president heads the National Security Council, the body voted on the memorandum, and the leader is overseeing that process rather than ruling like a king. He also says the statement signals caution because Iran has been burned before by U.S. promises, especially after the 2015 nuclear deal and Trump's withdrawal in 2018.
What is your personal opinion of the MOU and whether it serves Iranian interests?
He says he is not very optimistic because powerful actors in Washington, including Democrats, Republicans, Netanyahu, and the Israeli lobby, may want the agreement to fail. He thinks the agreement is partly designed to relieve oil-price pressure and that its success depends on whether Trump chooses to prioritize America first over Israel first.
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